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SEARCH AND SEIZURE: RECOGNIZING THE LIMITS OF THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN A FEDERAL GRAND JURY PROCEEDING
United States v. Calandra,94 S. Ct. 613 (1974)
Pursuant to a search warrant issued to recover bookmaking records and
wagering paraphernalia, federal agents conducted an extensive search of respondent's business premises and found what were believed to be "loansharking" records.' When subpoenaed to testify before a federal grand jury investigating loansharking activities in the area,2 respondent invoked the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to answer questions based on the seized evidence. Petitioner, the United States Government,
requested that the federal district court grant respondent transactional immunity. 3 The district court denied the petitioner's request and instead granted
respondent's motion to suppress the loansharking evidence on the grounds that
the affidavit supporting the warrant was insufficient and that the search exceeded the proper scope of the warrant. 4 The district court also ruled that due
process requires that grand jury witnesses be allowed to ascertain whether
evidence constituting the basis for questions to be asked of them was obtained
in a manner violative of fourth amendment search and seizure prohibitions. 5
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 6 On appeal, the Supreme
Court of the United States reversed and HELD, a witness summoned to appear before a grand jury may not refuse to respond to inquiries onl grounds
that the questions are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search
and seizure. 7
The grand jury has traditionally been afforded wide latitude to conduct
criminal investigations. 8 Subject only to judicial supervision, 9 the grand jury

1. 94 S. Ct. 613, 616 (1974).
2. Id.
3. Id. The request was made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2514 (1970), which provides in
part: "Whenever in the judgment of a United States attorney the testimony of any witness
... in an ... proceeding before any grand jury or court of the United States involving any
violation of this chapter . . . is necessary to the public interest, such United States attorney
...shall make application to the court that the witness shall be instructed to testify . . .
and upon order of the court such witness shall not be excused from testifying . . . on the
ground that the testimony . . may tend to incriminate him.. . . No such witness shall be
jprosecuted . . . for . . . any transaction . . . concerning which he is compelled . . . to
testify .... "
4. In re Calandra, 332 F. Supp. 737, 742-46 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
5. Id. at 742.
6. United States v. Calandra, 465 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1972).
7. 94 S. Ct. 613 (1974) (Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
8. Id. at 617. For a discussion of the grand jury's history and functions, see Costello v.
United States, 350 U.S. 359, 361-63 (1956); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279-83 (1919);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59-60 (1906). See also 1 V. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 321-23 (7th rev. ed. 1956); 1 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 151
(2d ed. 1899). See generally G. EDWARDS, THE GRAND JURY 1-44 (1906); R. YOUNGER, TiHE
PEOPLE'S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1634-1941 (1963).
9. FED. R. CRINI. P. 17(c) provides that the grand jury must rely on a court to compel
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may compel the testimony of appropriate witnesses or the production of
documentary evidence.1o Moreover, its broad powers" are rarely restricted by
the technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of crim2
inal trials.'
Historically, the grand jury has determined whether there is probable
cause to believe that a crime has been committed, while protecting citizens
against unfounded criminal prosecutions." a Although some authorities have
suggested that the grand jury presently functions only as a "rubber stamp" to
the prosecutor's personal whims,'4 the Supreme Court continues to stress the
grand jury's historical importance in the "fair and expeditious administration
of the criminal laws."' 5 Consequently, the Court has jealously guarded against
encroachments upon the scope of the grand jury's inquisitional and investiga-

tive powers.'6
While carefully guarding the grand jury's historical functions, the Court
has also attempted to protect fourth amendment guarantees. To effectuate the
right of all citizens "to be secure in their houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures,"'' the Court established the federal exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States' s to prohibit the introduction or use
of illegally obtained evidence in federal criminal trials.'9 The Court continued

production of books, papers, documents, and the testimony of witnesses. A court may also
quash or modify a subpoena or motion if compliance would be "unreasonable" or "oppressive." See also Brown v. United States, 859 U.S. 41, 49 (1959); FED. R. CRIm. P. 6, 17;
1 L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEnmR. RuLEs 475-77 (1966).
10. 94 S. Ct. at 617.
11. The classic statement on the breadth of the grand jury's powers is found in Blair v.
United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919): "It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by
questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts
whether any particular individual will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime.
As has been said before, the identity of the offender, and the precise nature of the offense,
if there be one, normally are developed at the conclusion of the grand jury's labors, not at
the beginning." Accord, United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (upholding a grand
jury's order compelling the witness to furnish voice exemplars); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 700 (1973) (holding that the grand jury's investigative powers must be broad if its
public responsibilities are to be adequately discharged); Kastigar v. United States, 406 US.
441 (1973) (affirming the power of the federal courts to compel persons to appear and
testify before a grand jury). See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 875 (1962); Costello v.
United States, 850 U.S. 859 (1956); United States v. Bryan, 39 U.S. 823 (1950).
12. 94 S. Ct. at 617. See Costello v. United States, 850 U.S. 359 (1956); Blair v. United
States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919).
18. 94 S. Ct. at 617.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 23 (1978) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see
Whyte, Is the Grand Jury Necessary?, 45 VA. L. R.y. 461 (1959).
15. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973); see United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S.
530, 582-33 (1971); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-25, 327-28 (1940).
16. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1973); Costello v. United States, 850 U.S.
859 (1959); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 278, 282 (1919).
17. U.S. CONsr. amend. IV.
18. 282 U.S. 883 (1914).
19. Id. at 898.
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to expand the rule in Elkins v. United States20 by rejecting the "silver platter"
doctrine.21 Under that doctrine, evidence obtained by state officers in an unreasonable search and seizure was admissible in a federal criminal trial if no
federal agent had participated in the illegal search and seizure and if the state
officers were not acting solely on behalf of the United States. 22 Later, in Mapp
v. Ohio,2 3 the Court extended the federal exclusionary rule to state criminal
proceedings.
The exclusionary rule's existence has been predicated upon two alternative
justifications. Originally, the Supreme Court adopted the "normative" rationale, premising the rule's creation on the need to maintain judicial integrity in
the criminal processes. 24 The modern trend, however, has been toward the application of a "deterrent" rationale, justifying the rule on grounds that it is
25
needed to deter future unlawful police conduct.
The rule's application in a grand jury context has been considered by the
Supreme Court in only two previous cases, 26 neither of which reached the
broader constitutional issue presented in the instant case. In Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States27 the plaintiffs-in-error had already been indicted
by a grand jury when they were summoned to reappear and answer questions
based on illegally seized evidence. 2 Significantly, the Supreme Court held that

20. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
21. The "silver platter" label was adopted by the Court in Lustig v. United States, 338
U.S. 74, 79 (1949).
22. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 208 (1960); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S.
74, 79 (1949); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1926).
23. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), which
had allowed states to adopt the common law rule that the admissibility of evidence was not
affected by the illegality of the means by which it was obtained.
24. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The classic statements defending the
normative rationale can be found in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-88 (1928)
(Brandeis, Holmes, JJ., dissenting). "In a government of laws, existence of the government
will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent,
the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.
Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the
law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself .... " Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J.). "I
think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play
an ignoble part." Id. at 470 (Holmes, J.). The instant dissent embraces this "imperative of
judicial integrity." 94 S.Ct. at 625, quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
25. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965) (purpose of the exclusionary rule
is "to deter the lawless action of the police and to effectively enforce the Fourth Amendment"); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (purpose of the exclusionary rule
is "to deter- to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way- by removing the incentive to disregard it"); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)
(rule's purpose is to deter violations of the search and seizure clause).
26. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 40 (1972); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). The Supreme Court's opinions, however, did not consider the
precise question of the instant case. Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit has specifically held
that the federal exclusionary rule is not applicable to grand jury proceedings. West v.
United States, 359 F.2d 50, 56 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 867 (1966).
27. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
28. Id. at 390-91.
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the plaintiffs-in-error, who were criminal defendants, could invoke the protective cloak of the federal exclusionary rule. 29 The instant Court used the
status of the plaintiffs-in-error as criminal defendants to distinguish Silve'thorne and thus prevent expansion of the rule's scope to a general grand jury
context. 30 In Gelbard v. United States31 the petitioner was the victim of a
wiretaps2 specifically made illegal by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968.3 Gelbard construed the Act to mean that a grand jury
wimess could not be held in contempt for his refusal to answer questions
based on evidence illegally intercepted through wiretapping or electronic
surveillance. 34 Significantly, neither of these two cases addressed the broad issue
of whether an individual who is not under an indictment or the subject of
other criminal prosecutions can rely solely on broad fourth amendment protections to prohibit the introduction or use of illegally seized evidence in
grand jury proceedings.
The instant case employed a balancing test in weighing potential damage
to the historical roles and functions of the grand jury against the benefits to
be derived from extending the exclusionary rule's scope to grand jury proceedings. Voicing essentially two concerns, the majority concluded that invocation of the exclusionary rule by a grand jury witness would unduly interfere with the effective and expeditious discharge of the jury's duties. 35 The
majority first stated that such an extension would act to precipitate adjudication of issues previously reserved for trial on the merits. 36 Second, suppression
hearings would halt the orderly progress of an investigation and might even
necessitate extended litigation of issues only tangentially related to the grand
jury's objectives.37 Thus, the probable result would be "protracted interrup-

29. Id. at 392.
30. 94 S. Ct. at 622 n.8. The majority opinion also distinguishes Silverthorne on several
other grounds. "Moreover, the Government's interest in recapturing the original documents
was founded on a belief that they might be useful in the criminal prosecutions already
authorized by the grand jury. It did not appear that the grand jury needed the documents
to perform its investigative or accusatorial functions. Thus, the primary consequence of the
court's decision was to exclude the evidence from subsequent criminal trial. Finally, prior
to the issuance of the grand jury subpoenas, there had been a judicial determination that
the search and seizure was illegal. The claim of plaintiffs-in-error was not raised for the
first time in a pre-indictment motion to suppress requiring interruption of grand jury
proceedings." Id. The broad dicta in Silverthorne that evidence illegally acquired shall not
be used at all is dismissed by the majority on the basis that this position has been substantially undermined by later cases. Id. This is contrary to the dissent's contention that

Silverthorne "plainly controls this case." Id. at 626.
31. 408 US. 41 (1972).
32. Id. at 43.
3. See Omnibus Crime Control &Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 US.C. §251 (1970), as
amended, 18 U.S.C. §§2510-20 (1970).
34. 408 US. at 47.
35. 94 S. Ct. at 620-21.
86. Id. at 621. An example of such an issue is whether the search producing the evidence

exceeded the scope of the warrant.
87. "The force of this argument is well illustrated by the facts of the present case. As
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tion of grand jury proceedings," 38 causing a delay that might be fatal to enforcement of the criminal law.39
In refusing to adopt the district court's definition of delay as "avoidable
delay,"40 the Court appears to have placed a premium on grand jury expediency rather than on early protection of individual rights. Nevertheless, the
majority preferred to reaffirm the duty to testify before a grand jury as a basic
obligation of all citizens to the Government,' 1 reading Silverthorne to support
its belief that actual post-indictment criminal processes do afford adequate
protection of fourth amendment rights to criminal defendants.4- Moreover,
the Court's "disinclination to allow litigious interference with grand jury
proceedings"' 3 was deemed necessary to protect public interest in the "fair
4
and expeditious administration of the criminal law."
Considering the exclusionary rule's benefits, the majority observed that the
incentive to disregard the requirements of the fourth amendment solely to
obtain a grand jury indictment is substantially negated by the inadmissibility
of the evidence in subsequent criminal proceedings.4 Aside from supporting
the adequate safeguards argument, this articulation evidences the Court's
growing dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule's ineffectiveness as a deterrent."6 Indeed, direct reference was made to studies demonstrating the rule's
failure to deter unlawful police conduct. 47 This reference is supported by
recent empirical data showing a high percentage of successful pretrial motions
to suppress illegally seized evidence in narcotics cases. 48 Beyond apparent dissatisfaction with the rule's deterrent effect, the instant decision, as the dissent

of the date of this decision, almost two and one-half years will have elapsed since respondent was summoned to appear and testify before the grand jury. If respondent's testimony was vital to the grand jury's investigation in August 1971 of extortionate credit
transactions, it is possible that this particular investigation has been completely frustrated."
94 S.Ct. at 621 n.7.
38. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 70 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
39. 94 S.Ct. at 621.
40. In re Calandra, 332 F. Supp. 737, 741 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
41. 94 S. Ct. at 618. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932) (recognizing
duty to testify before a grand jury); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919) (holding the
public has a right to evidence despite injury or embarrassment to social or economic status
of witnesses).
42. 94 S.Ct. at 622-23.
43. Id. at 621.
44. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
45. 94 S.Ct. at 621.
46. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). "Although I
would hesitate to abandon it until some meaningful substitute is developed, the history of
the suppression doctrine demonstrates that it is both conceptually sterile and practically ineffective in accomplishing its stated objectives." Id. at 415 (Burger, J., dissenting). See also
text accompanying note 51 infra.
47. 94 S. Ct. at 620. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37
U. Cr.L. REv. 665 (1970). See also Note, Kraus v. Superior Court: A Case Study on the
Failureof the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 13 SANTA CLARA LAw. 256 (1972).
48. Oaks, supra note 48, at 681-89.
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49
suggests, may well be rejecting the normative justification for the rule. This
rejection suggests that the judiciary need not worry as much with the "taint of
partnership in official lawlessness" 50 as with its apparent sanction of two

wrongs trying to make a right.51

52
It does not necessarily follow that an aggrieved person is without relief;
53
courts have the power to fashion alternative remedies. Although the ex4
clusionary rule is itself a judicially created tool," the trend is toward finding

more effective alternate remedies to redress injuries to individual privacy. For
example, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents55 the Court fashioned a
cause of action for money damages purely on the basis of the broad fourth
amendment search and seizure prohibitions. Judicial action could also fashion

other civil and even criminal penalties to deal with insubordinate government
56
agents.
Although the instant case will undoubtedly be criticized for its apparent

57
failure to ensure complete protection of individual rights, such criticism is

49. 94 S.Ct. at 614 (Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
50. Id. "The dissent also voices concern that today's decision will betray 'the imperative
of judicial integrity.' 'sanction illegal government conduct,' and even 'imperil the very
foundation of our people's trust in their government'. ... There is no basis for this alarn.
'Illegal conduct' is hardly sanctioned, nor are the foundations of the Republic imperiled, by
declining to make an unprecedented extension of the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings where the rule's objectives would not be effectively served and where other important and historic values would be unduly prejudiced." 94 S. Ct. at 623 n.11.
51. The classic statement demonstrating this philosophy is Wigmore's: "Titus, you have
been found guilty of conducting a lottery; Flavius, you have confessedly violated the Constitution. Titus ought to suffer imprisonment for crime, and Flavius for contempt. But no!
We shall let you both go free. We shall not punish Flavius directly, but shall do so by
reversing Titus' conviction. This is our way of teaching people like Flavius to behave, and
of teaching people like Titus to behave, and incidently of securing respect for the Constitution. Our way of upholding the Constitution is not to strike at the man who breaks it,
but to let off somebody else who broke something else." 8 J. WIGMoRE, EvmENcE §2184(a)
(3d ed. 1940). See People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21-24, 150 N.E. 585, 587-88 (1926). "The
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered .... A room is searched against
the law, and the body of a murdered man is found' .... The privacy of the home is infringed, and the murder goes free." Id. (Cardozo, J.).
52. 94 S. Ct. at 623 n.10. Remedies may include money damages, Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); return of illegally seized evidence and exclusion of the
evidence in a subsequent criminal trial, Go Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S.
344, 358 (1931). See, e.g., Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword,
85 HARv. L. REv. 1532 (1972); Roche, A Viable Substitute for the Exclusionary Rule: A Civil
Rights Appeals Board, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 223 (1973); Note, The Rights of a Witness
Before a Grand Jury, 1967 DuKE L.J. 97; Comment, Money Damages for Unconstitutional
Searchesand Seizures: Compensation or Deterrence?,1972 UTAH L. REv. 276.
53. See, e.g., Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
54. 94 S. Ct. at 620.
55. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
56. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 420-21 (1971) (Burger, J.,
dissenting).
57. See Note, Constitutional Law-Fourth Amendment -Federal Grand Jury Witness
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